How much and how fast should we react to the threat of global warming? The Stern Review argues that the damages from climate change are large, and that nations should undertake sharp and immediate reductions in greenhouse-gas emissions. An examination of the Review's radical revision of the economics of climate change finds, however, that it depends decisively on the assumption of a near-zero time discount rate combined with a specific utility function. The Review's unambiguous conclusions about the need for extreme immediate action will not survive the substitution of assumptions that are consistent with today's marketplace real interest rates and savings rates.
the globe at its unveiling, "It is not in doubt that if the science is right, the consequences for our planet are literally disastrous…. [W] ithout radical international measures to reduce carbon emissions within the next 10 to 15 years, there is compelling evidence to suggest we might lose the chance to control temperature rises." 4 The summary in the Review was equally stark: " [T] he Review estimates that if we don't act, the overall costs and risks of climate change will be equivalent to losing at least 5% of global GDP each year, now and forever. If a wider range of risks and impacts is taken into account, the estimates of damage could rise to 20% of GDP or more.… Our actions now and over the coming decades could create risks … on a scale similar to those associated with the great wars and the economic depression of the first half of the 20th century." 5 These results are dramatically different from earlier economic models that use the same basic data and analytical structure. One of the major findings in the economics of climate change has been that efficient or "optimal" economic policies to slow climate change involve modest rates of emissions reductions in the near term, followed by sharp reductions in the 4 Tony Blair [2006] . 5 Review, p. xv. 3 medium and long term. We might call this the climate-policy ramp, in which policies to slow global warming increasingly tighten or ramp up over time. 6 The findings about the climate-policy ramp have survived the tests of multiple alternative modeling strategies, different climate goals, alternative specifications of the scientific modules, and more than a decade of revisions in integrated assessment models. The logic of the climate-policy ramp is straightforward. In a world where capital is productive, the highest-return investments today are primarily in tangible, technological, and human capital, including research and development on low-carbon technologies. In the coming decades, damages are predicted to rise relative to output. As that occurs, it becomes efficient to shift investments toward more intensive emissions reductions. The exact mix and timing of emissions reductions depends upon details of costs, damages, and the extent to which climate change and damages are non-linear and irreversible.
There are many perils, costs, and uncertainties -known unknowns as well as unknown unknowns -involved in unchecked climate change. 7 6 This strategy is a hallmark of virtually every study of inter-temporal efficiency in climate-change policy. It was one of the major conclusions in a review of integratedassessment models: "Perhaps the most surprising result is the consensus that given calibrated interest rates and low future economic growth, modest controls are generally optimal" (David L. Kelly and Charles D. Kolstad [1999] ). A survey of the results of greenhouse-gas stabilization in several models in contained in Energy Modeling Forum Study 19 [2004] . This result has been found in all five generations of the Yale/DICE/RICE global-warming models developed over the period; see the references in footnote 28.
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Economic analyses have searched for strategies that will balance the costs of action with the perils of inaction. All economic studies find a case for imposing immediate restraints on greenhouse-gas emissions, but the difficult questions are how much and how fast. The Review is in the tradition of economic cost-benefit analyses, but it has strikingly different conclusions from the mainstream economic models. 8 Because it has conclusions that are so different from most economic studies, the present note examines the reasons for this major difference. Is this radical revision of global-warming economics warranted? What are the reasons for the difference? 9 7 For a recent warning, see James Hansen, Makiko Sato, Reto Ruedy, Ken Lo, David W. Lea, and Martin Medina-Elizade [2006] . 8 An early precursor of this Review is the study by William R. Cline [1992] . Cline's analysis of discounting was virtually identical to that in the Review. 9 There is by spring 2007 a large body of commentary on the Stern Review, including the companion article by Martin Weitzman in this issue. A critical discussion of key assumptions is provided in Richard Tol and Gary Yohe [2006] and Robert Mendelsohn [2006] . A particularly useful discussion of discounting issues is contained in Partha Dasgupta [2006] . An analysis which focuses on the extreme findings of the Review is S. Niggol Seo [2006] . A discussion of ethics is in Wilfred Beckerman and Cameron Hepburn [2007] . A sensitivity analysis of the ethical parameters with much the same message as the present article is Sergey Mityakov and Christof Ruehl [2007] . A wide-ranging attack on various elements is contained in Robert M. Carter, C. R. de Freitas, Indur M. Goklany, David Holland, and Richard S. Lindzen [2006] 
II. Overview of the Issues
I will not summarize the basic findings of the Review -a clear summary is found in its introduction -nor will I review the many reviews of the Review.
Instead, I begin with some summary reactions.
First, the Review should be read primarily as a document that is political in nature and has advocacy as its purpose. The review was officially commissioned when British Chancellor of the Exchequer Gordon Brown "asked Sir Nick Stern to lead a major review of the economics of climate change, to understand more comprehensively the nature of the economic challenges and how they can be met, in the UK and globally." 10 The scientific ground rules of government reports produced by professional scientists and economists are not codified. My vantage point, having been both producer and consumer of government reports, is that we expect them to be factually correct, present a professionally accurate representation of the technical scientific issues, support the government's policies, but not necessarily to be a textbook with a balanced view of all competing theories. By this definition of the ground rules, the Review fits well within the boundaries. For the most part, it accurately describes the basic economic questions involved in global warming. However, it tends to emphasize studies and findings that support its policy recommendations, while reports with opposing views of the dangers of global warming are ignored. Such are the rules of the game, but we should be alert in reading the Review that -even though it was published by a university press -it is not standard academic analysis. 10 Stern Review Web page [2007] .
Putting this point differently, we might evaluate the Review in terms of the ground rules of standard science and economics. The central methodology by which science, including economics, operates is peer review and reproducibility. By contrast, the Review was published without an appraisal of methods and assumptions by independent outside experts. Nor can its results be easily reproduced.
These may be seen as minor points, but they are fundamental for good science. The British government is not infallible in questions of economic and scientific analysis on global warming, any more than it was in its white paper on weapons of mass destruction in Iraq. 11 External review and reproducibility cannot remove all error, but they are essential for ensuring logical reasoning and a respect for opposing arguments. From a practical point of view, these cannot be undertaken after the government and scholars involved have publicly staked out a position, so they also protect the authors from correctible mistakes. This deviation from the norm of modern science does not necessarily discredit the Review, but it does mean that fatal flaws in evidence and reasoning, which might have been caught in the early stages under normal ground rules, may emerge after the report has been published.
A related issue is the difficulty that readers may have in understanding the chain of reasoning. The Review was prepared in record speed. One of the unfortunate consequences of haste is that the Review is a thicket of vaguely connected analyses and reports on the many facets of the economics and science of global warming. Readers will find it difficult to understand or reproduce the line of reasoning that goes from background trends (such as 11 UK White Paper on WMD [2002] . 7 population and technology) through emissions and impacts, to the finding about the 20 percent cut in consumption, now and forever.
In reflecting upon the haste and bulk, I am reminded of a remark by Mark Twain, who said he could write two pages in thirty days or thirty pages in two days, but he could not write two pages in two days. We could only wish that the Review's authors had taken a few more months and written a more concise and consistent treatise. But these points are not the nub of the matter. Rather, the Review's radical view of policy stems from an extreme assumption about discounting.
Discounting is a factor in climate-change policy -indeed in all investment decisions -that involves the relative weight of future and present payoffs. At first blush, this area would seem a technicality. Unfortunately, it cannot be buried in a footnote, for discounting is the central to the radical revision. The
Review proposes ethical assumptions that produce very low discount rates.
Combined with other assumptions, this magnifies impacts in the distant future and rationalizes deep cuts in emissions, and indeed in all consumption, today. If we substitute more conventional discount rates used in other globalwarming analyses, by governments, by consumers, or by businesses, the Review's dramatic results disappear, and we come back to the climate-policy ramp described above. The balance of this discussion focuses on this central issue.
III. Discounting in Growth and Climate Change
Questions of discounting are central to understanding economic growth theory and policy. They also lie at the heart of the Review's radical view of the grave damages from climate change and the need for immediate steps to reduce greenhouse gas emissions sharply. This section reviews some of the core issues, while the next section provides an empirical application of alternative approaches.
a. Alternative discount concepts
Debates about discounting have a long history in economics and public policy. Discounting involves two related and often confused concepts. One is the idea of a discount rate on goods, which is a positive concept that measures a relative price of goods at different points of time. This is also called the real return on capital, the real interest rate, the opportunity cost of capital, and the The second important discount concept involves the relative weight of the economic welfare of different households or generations over time. This is sometimes called the pure rate of social time preference, but I will denote it the "time discount rate" for brevity. It is calculated in percent per unit time, like an interest rate, but refers to the discount in future welfare, not future goods or dollars. A zero time discount rate means that future generations into the indefinite future are treated symmetrically with present generations; a positive time discount rate means that the welfare of future generations is reduced or "discounted" compared to nearer generations. Philosophers and economists have conducted vigorous debates about how to apply time discount rates in areas as diverse as economic growth, climate change, energy policy, nuclear waste, major infrastructure programs such as levees, and reparations for slavery. 14 The sections that follow examine the analytical and philosophical arguments about intergenerational equity, how discounting affects the measurement of damages, the role of discounting in economic modeling of climate change, saving behavior, and behavior under uncertainty.
b. The analytical background of optimal economic growth
Like many other economic studies of the economics of global warming, the Review puts policy decisions about how to balance emissions reductions with damages in the framework of economic growth theory. In this framework, the economies of the world begin with reference paths for consumption, capital, population, emissions, climate, and so on. Policies change the trajectory of emissions, GHG concentrations, impacts, and consumption. Alternative paths of climate policies and consumption are then evaluated using a social-welfare function that ranks different paths.
The specific approach used to model the economy and to evaluate the outcomes is the Ramsey-Koopmans-Cass model of optimal economic growth. 15 In this theory, a central decision maker desires to maximize a social welfare function that is the discounted value of utility of consumption over 
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per year, which is only vaguely justified by estimates of the probability of extinction; for our purposes, it can be treated as near-zero.
This approach makes the further convenient assumption that the utility function has a constant elasticity of the marginal utility of consumption, which I call "consumption elasticity" for short. This leads to
Optimizing the social welfare function with a constant population and a constant rate of growth of consumption per generation, g * , yields the standard equation for the relationship between the equilibrium real return on capital, , and the other parameters,
We call this the "Ramsey equation," which is embraced by the Review as the organizing concept for thinking about intertemporal choices for policies for global warming. The Ramsey equation shows that in a welfare optimum, the rate of return on capital is determined by the generational rate of time preference, the extent to which social policies have aversion to consumption inequality among generations, and the rate of growth of generational consumption. In a growing economy, a high return to capital can arise either from a high time discount rate or high aversion to generational inequality.
How convincing is the Review's argument for its social welfare function, consumption elasticity, and time discount rate? To begin with, there is a major issue concerning the views that are embodied in the social welfare function adopted by the Review. The Review takes the lofty vantage point of the world social planner, perhaps stoking the dying embers of the British Empire, in determining the way the world should combat the dangers of global warming.
14 The world, according to Government House utilitarianism, 17 should use the combination of time discounting and consumption elasticity that the Review's authors find persuasive from their ethical vantage point.
I have always found the Government House approach misleading in the context of global warming and particularly as it informs the negotiations of policies among sovereign states. Instead, I would interpret the baseline trajectory, from a conceptual point of view, as one that represents the outcome of market and policy factors as they currently exist. In other words, the baseline model is an attempt to project from a positive perspective the levels and growth of population, output, consumption, saving, interest rates, greenhouse gas emissions, climate change, and climatic damages as would occur with no interventions to affect greenhouse-gas emissions. This approach does not make a case for the social desirability of the distribution of incomes over space or time of existing conditions, any more than a marine biologist makes a moral judgment on the equity of the eating habits of marine organisms in attempting to understand the effect of acidification on marine life.
The calculations of changes in world welfare from efficient climatechange policies examine potential improvements within the context of the existing distribution of income and investments across space and time. As this approach relates to discounting, it requires that we look carefully at the 17 The phrase is due to Amartya Sen and Bernard Williams [1982] , p. 16, which they describe as "social arrangements under which a utilitarian elite controls a society in which the majority may not itself share those beliefs." Dasgupta [2005] discusses Government House ethics in the context of discounting.
returns on alternative investments -at the real real interest rate -as the benchmarks for climatic investments. The normatively acceptable real interest rates prescribed by philosophers, economists, or the British government are irrelevant to determining the appropriate discount rate to use in the actual financial and capital markets of the United States, China, Brazil, and the rest of the world. When countries weigh their self-interest in international bargains about emissions reductions and burden sharing, they will look at the actual gains from bargains, and the returns on these relative to other investments, rather than the gains that would come from a theoretical growth model.
c. Philosophical questions about the time discount rate
Although I find the ethical reasoning on discount rates in the Review largely irrelevant for the actual investments and negotiations about climate change, it is worth considering the arguments on their own merits. At the outset, we should recall the warning that Tjalling Koopmans gave in his pathbreaking analysis of discounting in growth theory. He wrote, "[T]he problem of optimal growth is too complicated, or at least too unfamiliar, for one to feel comfortable in making an entirely a priori choice of [a time discount rate] before one knows the implications of alternative choices." 18 This conclusion applies with even greater force in global warming models, which have much greater complexity than the simple, deterministic, stationary, twoinput models that Koopmans analyzed. However, none of these approaches touches on the structure of actual intertemporal decision-making, in which this generation cannot decide for or tie the hands of future generations. 20 Instead, each generation is in the 19 Many of the concerns in the following paragraphs are discussed in the attacks and defenses of utilitarianism in Amartya Sen and Bernard Williams [1982] . 20 Such is the spirit of the study of E. S. Phelps and R. A. Pollak [1968] . position of one member of a relay team, handing off the baton of capital to t next generation, and hoping that future generations behave sensibly and avoid catastrophic choices by dropping or destroying the baton. Moreover, because we live in an open-economy world of sometimes-competing and sometimes-cooperating relay teams, we must consider how the world capital market will equilibrate to the simultaneous relay races, baton-dropping, existential wars, and differing norms over he space and time.
None of these alternatives is seriously considered by the Review. 18 consume goods and services that are largely unimagined today. These will almost certainly involve unrecognizably different health-care technologies, with supercomputers cheap enough and small enough to fit under the skin, and future generations that grow up and adapt to a world that is vastly different from that of today. It would be useful to determine how robust our prescriptions are to alternative formulations of the preference structures.
These would include preferences where utility adapts to the level of consumption, or where consumption is compared to the last generation, or where large parts of the population lose interest in economic goods and turn to ascetic pursuits, or where rich nations use higher productivity to develop fiendish new weapons, or where people come to love the altered landscape of the warmer world. Perhaps we need to consider a model with uncertainty about preferences along with uncertainty about extinction, but this is largely uncharted territory in economic growth theory.
d. Real interest rates under alternative calibrations of the Ramsey equation
While time discount rates get most of the headlines, the real return on capital is the variable that drives efficient current emissions reductions. It is the real return on capital that enters into the equality between the marginal consumption cost of emissions reductions today and the discounted marginal consumption benefit of reduced climate damages in the future.
However, in the optimal growth framework, the real return is an endogenous variable that is determined by the Ramsey equation discussed above. In equilibrium, the real interest rate depends not only on the time discount rate but also upon a second ethical parameter, the consumption elasticity. A realistic analysis would also need to account for distortions from the tax system, for uncertainties, and for risk premiums on investments, but these complications will be ignored in the present context. 22 The Review assumes that the consumption elasticity is 1 = α , which yields the logarithmic utility function. The elasticity parameter is casually discussed, with no justification in the original report. 23 With its assumed longrun growth of per capita output of 1.3 percent per year and the time discount rate of 0.1 percent per year, this leads to an equilibrium real interest rate of 1.4 percent per year. This rate is apparently used in a partial-equilibrium framework without any reference to either actual rates of return or to the possibility that the economy might not have reached the long-run equilibrium.
Even though the real interest rate is crucial to balancing present and future, there is no apparent reference to any of this in the Review. However, in calibrating a growth model, the time discount rate and the consumption elasticity cannot be chosen independently if the model is designed to match 22 The interpretation of the divergence between the rate of return on capital and the risk-free rate raises an issue in this context. If we assume that this gap is determined in markets as a systematic premium on risky assets, then we would need to investigate the risk characteristics of investments in climate change. The discussion here assumes that climatic investments share the risk properties of other capital investments. If they were shown to have more or less systematic risk, then the risk premium on climatic investments would need to be appropriately adjusted. 23 The discussion of the consumption elasticity is contained in the Appendix to Chapter 2. Note as well that since the consumption elasticity is a parameter that reflects social choices about consumption inequality across generations, it cannot be automatically derived from individual preferences or risk aversion. 20 observable real interest rates and savings rates. To match a real interest rate of, say, 4 percent and a growth in per capita consumption of 1.3 percent per year requires some combination of high time discounting and high consumption elasticity. For example, using the Review's economic growth, a zero time discount rate requires a consumption elasticity of 3 to produce a 4 percent rate of return. If we adopt the Stern consumption elasticity of 1, then we need a time discount rate of 2.7 percent per year to match observed rates of return. The Review's approach also has an important implication for consumption and saving. 24 If the Review's philosophy were adopted, it would produce much higher overall saving as compared with today. To a first approximation, the Review's assumptions about time discounting and the consumption elasticity would lead to a doubling of the optimal global net savings rate. While this might be worth contemplating, it hardly seems ethically compelling. Global per capita consumption today is around $10,000.
According to the Review's assumptions, this will grow at 1.3 percent per year, to around $130,000 in two centuries. Using these numbers, how persuasive is the ethical stance that we have a duty to reduce current consumption by a substantial amount to improve the welfare of the rich future generations?
e. A fiscal-policy experiment
We can put the Ramsey analysis in an intuitive manner by considering a fiscal experiment that asks whether a particular abatement policy improves the consumption possibilities of future generations. Begin with the path of consumption that corresponds to the current state of affairs -one in which there are essentially no policies to reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions.
Can this path the "baseline" trajectory.
Then, adopt a set of abatement strategies that correspond to the optimum in the Ramsey growth model. However, along with this optimal abatement strategy, we undertake fiscal tax and transfer policies to maintain the baseline consumption levels for the present (say for 50 years). The optimum might have slightly lower consumption in the early years, so the fiscal-policy experiment would involve both abatement and fiscal deficits and debt accumulation for some time, followed by fiscal surpluses and debt repayment later. Call this the "optimal-plus-deficit" strategy. In essence, this alternative keeps consumption the same for the present but rearranges societal investments away from conventional capital (structures, equipment, education, and the like) to investments in abatement of GHG emissions (in "climate capital," so to speak).
Assuming that the investments and fiscal policies are efficiently designed, so that capital continues to earn its marginal product as measured by the market real return, the optimal-plus-deficit strategy will increase the consumption possibilities of all future generations (those coming after 50 years). In other words, the abatement policies are indeed Pareto-improving.
This implies that at some point the returns to the investments in climate capital will be reaped, output will rise above the baseline level, and the debt can be repaid.
We can also use this framework to evaluate the Review's very tight emissions reductions strategy. Consider undertaking the Review's emissionscontrol strategy and using fiscal policies to keep consumption unchanged for 50 years -that is the "Review-plus-deficit" strategy. It is certain that (using returns on capital that match estimated market returns) the Review's strategy would leave future generations with less consumption than the optimumplus-deficit. Indeed, by my calculations, the Review's strategy would leave the future absolutely worse off -it would be Pareto-deteriorating. The reason why the Review's approach is inefficient is that it invests too much in lowyield abatement strategies too early. After 50 years, conventional capital is much reduced, while "climate capital" is only slightly increased. The efficient strategy has more investment in conventional capital at the beginning and can use those additional resources to invest heavily in climate capital later on.
f. Measuring impacts with near-zero discounting
These analytical points are useful for understanding the Review's estimates of the damages from climate change. The Review concludes, "Putting these … factors together would probably increase the cost of climate change to the equivalent of a 20% cut in per-capita consumption, now and forever." This frightening statement suggests that the globe is perilously close to driving off a climatic cliff in the very near future. Faced with such a grave prospect, any sensible person would surely reconsider current policies.
A close look reveals that the statement is quite misleading because it employs an unusual definition of consumption losses. When the Review says that there are substantial losses "now," it does not mean "today." The measure of consumption used is the "balanced growth equivalents" of consumption, which is essentially a proportional income annuity. With zero discounting, this is the certainty equivalent of the average annual consumption loss over the indefinite future.
In fact, the Review's estimate of the output loss now, as in "today," is essentially zero. Moreover, the projected impacts from climate change are far into the future. Take as an example the high-climate scenario with catastrophic and non-market impacts. For this case, the mean losses are 0.4 percent of world output in 2060, 2.9 percent in 2100, and 13.8 percent in 2200. 25 This is calculated as a loss in "current per capita consumption" of 14.4 percent shown in Table 6 .1. With even further gloomy adjustments, it becom the "high+" case of "20% cut in per-capita consumption, now and forever es ."
How do damages, which average around 1 percent of output over the next century, become a 14.4 percent reduction in consumption now and forever? The answer is that, with near-zero discounting, the low damages in the next two centuries get overwhelmed by the long-term average over the 25 Review, Figure 6 .5d, p. 178 and p. 177. many centuries that follow. In fact, using the Review's methodology, more than half of the estimated damages "now and forever" occur after the year 2800. The damage puzzle is resolved. The large damages from global warming reflect large and speculative damages in the far-distant future magnified into a large current value by a near-zero time discount rate.
g. A wrinkle experiment
The effect of low discounting can be illustrated with a "wrinkle experiment." Suppose that scientists discover a wrinkle in the climate system that will cause damages equal to 0.1 percent of net consumption starting in 2200 and continuing at that rate forever after. How large a one-time investment would be justified today to remove the wrinkle that starts only after two centuries? Using the methodology of the Review, the answer is that we should pay up to 56 percent of one year's world consumption today to remove the wrinkle. 26 In other words, it is worth a one-time consumption hit of approximately $30,000 billion today to fix a tiny problem that begins in 2200. It is illuminating to put this point in terms of average consumption levels. Using the Review's growth projections, the Review would justify reducing per capita consumption for one year today from $10,000 to $4400 in order to prevent a reduction of consumption from $130,000 to $129,870 starting two centuries hence and continuing at that rate forever after.
The bizarre result arises because the value of the future consumption stream is so high with near-zero time discounting that we would trade off a large fraction of today's income to increase a far-future income stream by a very tiny fraction. This is yet another reminder of Koopmans's warning quoted above to proceed cautiously to accept theoretical assumptions about discounting before examining their full consequences.
h. Hair triggers and uncertainty
A related feature of the Review's near-zero time discount rate is that it puts present decisions on a hair-trigger in response to far-future contingencies. Under conventional discounting, contingencies many centuries ahead have a tiny weight in today's decisions. Decisions focus on the near future. With the Review's discounting procedure, by contrast, present decisions become extremely sensitive to uncertain events in the distant future.
We saw above how an infinitesimal impact on the post-2200 income stream could justify a large consumption sacrifice today. We can use the same For linear utility, the wrinkle has present value of 81.8 percent of one year's current consumption. The number in the text is slightly lower because of curvature of the utility function.
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example to illustrate how far-future uncertainties are magnified by low discount rates. Suppose that the climatic wrinkle is not a sure thing; rather, there is a 10 percent probability of a wrinkle that would reduce the post-2200 income stream by 0.1 percent. What insurance premium would be justified today to reduce that probability to zero? With conventional discount rates, and one might say with common sense, we would ignore any tiny lowprobability wrinkle two centuries ahead.
With the Review's near-zero discount rate, offsetting the low-probability wrinkle would be enormously valuable. We would pay an insurance premium today of as much as 8 percent of one year's consumption (about $4 trillion) to remove the year-2200 contingency. If the contingency were thought to occur in 2400 rather than 2200, the insurance premium would still be 6½ percent of one year's income. Because the future is so greatly magnified by a near-zero time discount rate, policies would be virtually identical for different threshold dates. Moreover, a small refinement in the probability estimate would trigger a large change in the dollar premium. If someone discovered that the probability was 15 percent rather than 10 percent, the insurance premium would rise by almost $2 trillion.
While this feature of low discounting might appear benign in climatechange policy, we could imagine other areas where the implications could themselves be dangerous. Imagine the preventive war strategies that might be devised with low time discount rates. Countries might start wars today because of the possibility of nuclear proliferation a century ahead; or because of a potential adverse shift in the balance of power two centuries ahead; or because of speculative futuristic technologies three centuries ahead. It is not clear how long the globe could long survive the calculations and machinations of zero-discount-rate military strategists. This is yet a final example of a surprising implication of a low discount rate.
IV. Modeling alternative discount strategies in the DICE-2007 model
The analytical points discussed in earlier sections can usefully be illustrated using an empirical model of the economics of global warming. needed here. The "social cost of carbon" is the marginal damage caused by an additional ton of carbon emissions. In a dynamic framework, it is the discounted value of the change in the utility of consumption denominated in terms of current consumption. The "optimal carbon price," or "optimal carbon tax," is the price (or carbon tax) on carbon emissions that balances the incremental costs of reducing carbon emissions with the incremental benefits of reducing climate damages. In an uncontrolled regime, the social cost of carbon will exceed the (zero) carbon price. In an optimal regime, the carbon tax will equal the social cost of carbon. The "emissions reduction rate" is relative to a no-controls baseline. One of the problems with run 2 is that it generates real returns that are too low and savings rates that too high as compared with actual market data.
We correct this with run 3, optimal climate change with zero discount rate and 34 Sergey Mityakov and Christof Ruehl [2007] .
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into the hat and is responsible for unusual results. One of the major flaws in the Review is the absence of just these robust analyses.
V. Summary Verdict
How much and how fast should the globe reduce greenhouse-gas emissions? How should nations balance the costs of the reductions against the damages and dangers of climate change? The Stern Review answers these questions clearly and unambiguously: we need urgent, sharp, and immediate reductions in greenhouse-gas emissions. Conceptually, the return is the discount rate on consumption from one period to the next. Note that there is no inflation, risk, or taxes in the model. The figure is the estimated geometric average real return from the date shown to the next date.
